In response to the tragedy of the 2017 Grenfell Tower fire, the UK government ordered a multi-year inquiry into the causes of the blaze. Recognising the report published 4th September 2024 is a long and highly complex document, Adaston believes part of its duty as a leading fire protection consultant is to summarise the findings of the inquiry for business partners and Contracting Authorities. In doing so, Adaston hopes to enable discussions in the passive fire protection industry and help shape a safe, positive way forwards for housing authorities and their residents.

While other bodies are better placed to discuss external cladding, material manufacture or public body responses, this report will focus on those elements of fire protection which fall within Adaston’s expertise.

In response to the tragedy of the 2017 Grenfell Tower fire, the UK government ordered a multi-year inquiry into the causes of the blaze. Recognising that the report published 4th September 2024 is a long and highly complex document, Adaston believes that part of its duty as a leading fire protection consultant is to summarise the findings of the inquiry for business partners and Contracting Authorities. In doing so, Adaston hopes to enable discussions in the Passive Fire Protection industry and help shape a safe, positive way forwards for housing authorities and their residents.

While other bodies are better placed to discuss external cladding, material manufacture, or public body responses, this report will focus on those elements of fire protection which fall within Adaston’s expertise.

Fire Risk Assessments

As chapters 34-46 of the report details, fire risk assessments (FRAs) are an essential duty of all building owners—and unfortunately, they were not treated with sufficient seriousness by authorities at Grenfell. An FRA is a key building block of a successful fire safety strategy, highlighting where repairs and remediations are needed to a building, and allowing a clear course of corrective action.

In the first instance, the report highlights the importance of employing a properly-qualified fire risk assessor to ensure that FRAs are carried out to a competent standard. While the work of an unqualified assessor at Grenfell allowed for obvious advisory issues to be identified, it was insufficient to spot deeper problems with the safety of either the Adair or Grenfell blocks. Under the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015, commercial clients have a duty to ensure the contractors they appoint are competent to carry out the programme of work. Indeed, chapter 38 of the Inquiry’s report specifically highlights the importance of an ISO 9001-standard quality management policy to ensure compliance. In this respect, there is no substitute for hiring qualified and accredited contractors.

Secondly, the housing authority at Grenfell failed to take seriously the risks highlighted by the FRA (chapter 39). Clear problems with the building were disregarded by the authority, and pressure was placed on the assessor to downgrade certain risks in order to save time and money. While resources are of course finite, and contracting authorities have every right to prioritise tasks, the report is explicit that this “was not acting professionally or in accordance with those standards” (chapters 39-46). Whatever reforms emerge from the Grenfell Inquiry, one can be certain that far greater scrutiny will be given to contracting authorities having adequate FRAs and ensuring action is taken.

Compartmentation

Amidst the major headlines around building cladding and flammable exteriors, one issue which the Inquiry notes is the role of internal compartmentation in the fatalities of the Grenfell fire. In the report’s comprehensive explanation of the circumstances of the 72 individuals who lost their lives (chapters 84-97), it is readily apparent that inhalation of smoke and toxic byproducts of fire was a leading cause of death.

It is in this context that compartmentation becomes a major concern for building safety. Adequate smoke-resistance of materials can greatly reduce the risk of unconsciousness for residents during a fire, increasing their chances of escape or rescue and saving lives. The difference between an FD30 and FD30S rated door can therefore—in the right situation—make a meaningful difference to the survival and safety of residents.

While the external cladding of Grenfell Tower rightly occupies a central place in the cause and scope of the tragedy, the internal passive fire protection of the block mattered, were tested, and were found wanting. Contracting authorities should, going forwards, be deeply concerned with compartmentation and smoke-resistance within their fire remedial works, and demand that it holds a central place in their fire risk assessments and surveys.

What Is the Difference Between FD30 and FD30S Fire Doors?

FD30 Fire Doors: These doors can withstand fire for 30 minutes, providing protection against the spread of fire and smoke. However, they do not include additional features to prevent smoke from passing through.

FD30S Fire Doors: These doors also offer 30 minutes of fire resistance, but include a smoke seal to prevent the passage of smoke. This feature is crucial for maintaining a safe environment during a fire by controlling smoke spread.

To summarise, both FD30 and FD30S fire doors offer similar performance regarding fire resistance. However, while FD30 is more common, FD30S provides more protection against smoke spread and is considered the better option.

Resident Engagement

One element focused on repeatedly by the Inquiry’s report is the relationship between the tenant management organisation (TMO) acting on behalf of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and the tenants of Grenfell Tower. The report recognises that the “dependence [on social housing] created an unequal relationship” between the TMO and residents, and that inappropriate communication between residents and the authority created “a toxic atmosphere fuelled by mistrust” (chapter 33).

The report highlights that adequate resident liaison is an essential part of construction work and the ongoing relationship between housing authorities and their residents. Without the ability to have their voices heard, residents were unable to raise concerns about building safety to the authority. Indeed, one resident asked in good faith whether the appointed architect was qualified—a question which, had the honest answer been given, could have prevented the dangerous construction and ultimately saved lives—and was ignored by the TMO (chapters 33-45).

Where the TMO did perform tenant engagement, it was cursory and surface-level, often never properly taking the concerns of residents onboard (chapters 33-46). Had the TMO or its appointed contractors made better attempts to liaise with residents across the course of works, issues or concerns could have been highlighted sooner and addressed in time. The Grenfell fire reveals the dangers of inadequate resident engagement in occupied building works, and it is highly likely that resident liaison arrangements will be a focal point for reforming legislation. In order to deliver a higher quality of ongoing service to residents, contracting authorities should work to develop resident liaison procedures with any external contractors, prioritising the voices of residents in their processes.

Procurement

One of the most damning elements of the report’s “path to disaster” was a wholly inadequate procurement process for suppliers and contractors on Grenfell Tower. The refurbishment process was conducted by contractors deemed “incompetent” by the Inquiry (chapters 22-134), and appointed through an unfair process (Executive Summary, Part 6, 2.70-2.72). The selection of a principal designer without competitive tender for a project of this size should have come under scrutiny even without a major resultant disaster, but the occurrence of one demonstrates the clear dangers of ignoring proper tendering procedure.

In its appointments, the authority prioritised firms which it had previously worked with, failing to consider whether their experience from one programme would transfer to a different one—in this case, from a programme without a fire safety component to one with a significant component. The desire to maintain ongoing contractor relationships is natural, and can often lead to strong partnerships; but contracting authorities must be aware of the risks in blindly appointing a contractor or designer across different fields.

This should of course be read in the context of the Procurement Act (England) 2023 and the forthcoming Procurement Regulations 2024 due to come into force in October, which will already take steps to avoid such uncompetitive appointment processes. In any case, contracting authorities must be aware that they are under particular scrutiny for the processes used to appoint contractors to fire safety related programmes, and construction companies within the fire protections sector should likewise expect to see close examination of their practices and relationships. 

Legislative Reform

While the Grenfell Tower Inquiry does not have any binding power to control the construction industry, it would be safe to assume that its findings and recommendations will underpin future legislation on the construction industry—and in particular, the fire protection sector. While one cannot assume that all recommendations will be enacted, the key themes of Sir Martin Moore-Bick’s proposed reforms are:

• Bringing all responsibility for building safety under a single government department;
• Appointing a construction regulator to oversee the whole industry’s safety standards;
• Making fire safety strategies a mandatory element of the planning phase for all building and refurbishment works to high-risk buildings (likely the same definition as HRRBs under the Building Safety Act 2023). 

In Parliament today, the Prime Minister outlined proposed plans to reform the construction industry to ensure fire safety and compliance. In a speech this morning, he announced the speed at which known fire risks—including cladding—are being addressed is “too slow” and that “a moment of change” is needed. He has timetabled a programme of legislative and regulatory reform to be set out in the Autumn.

When that new regulatory enforcement comes, it is likely to follow the recommendations and findings of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. In order for contracting authorities and construction firms to stay ahead of the curve, the Inquiry’s report should be taken seriously as a basis for action now. Authorities and trusted, qualified contractors must take steps on both ongoing and upcoming projects to ensure that they will be on the right side of the coming reform.